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This paper attempts to analyze the results of Japan‟s new bar examination, so far 
held in 2006 and 2007, and to investigate why the new bar examination had 
unanticipated outcomes.  The major findings from regression analysis are: (1) The 
ratio of professor committee members affects the pass rate. Further, committee 
members specializing in the compulsory common subjects have a more significant 
effect than those specializing in the selective subject areas. (2) The high pass rate for 
prestigious national law schools is mainly to the result of the high ratio of professor 
committee members, while the pass rate of private law schools is partly related. (3) 
Ratios of committee members from prestigious law schools at 8-22% is significantly 
higher than for non prestigious law schools.  The unexpected outcomes that stem from 
the shortcomings of the new bar examination are in line with concept that 
high-powered incentive schemes are likely to induce behavior distortions (Jacob and 
Levitt, 2003).  To prevent professorial cheating and to achieve fairness in the new bar 
examination, the Ministry of Justice should at least take steps not to appoint law 
schools professors as committee members.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
    
As a response to the new bar examination, which came as part of Japan‟s legal 
reforms and was planned to commence in 2006, new law schools began operation from 
1 April 2004.  The reforms were aimed to overcome the strict and extraordinarily 
competitive bar examination by transplanting aspects of the US law school model.  
Such a deregulation of the lawyer market was anticipated have benefits through 
increasing the supply of lawyers (Kinoshita 2000, 2002), and also hoped to resolve 
problems arising from the former examination which required a particular set of skills 
and specific techniques (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology 2004).   Consequently, 68 new law schools commenced operation in 2004 
with another 6 opening in 2005; thus the number of new law schools reached 74.  The 
mushrooming of new law schools actually resulted in the new bar examination 
becoming even more competitive than it was predicted. This was mainly because of the 
larger number of new entrants than initially expected.  This competitive pressure 
seems to have induced the new law schools to focus on the skills and techniques 
emphasized in the new bar examination; however, the desire was for the new law 
schools to focus on legal qualification through a „process‟ of legal education, rather than 
focus at the „point‟ of the bar examination(Asahi Newspaper 2007d,Tamura 2007).  
The Ministry of Justice appointed the members of the new bar examination 
committee that is responsible for setting and grading the examination. These members 
were selected from public persecutors, attorneys, and university professors1, including 
those at the new law schools (Ministry of justice 2005, 2006, 2007).  This meant that a 
new law school professor who was also member of examination committee could 
legitimately obtain copies of the examination prior to the examination date.  Under 
the competitive circumstance that the new law schools envisaged, a member of the new 
bar examination committee, who was also a professor at Keio University Law School2, 
informed his students about the content of a new bar examination in 20073.  The 
scandal clearly cast doubt on the fairness of the newly introduced bar examination 
(Asahi Newspaper 2007b, Enomoto 2007).   This situation appears consistent with 
                                                   
1 Not only professors but also associate professors and lecturers are able to lecture in 
Japanese law schools.  For the sake of simplicity I call all such lecturers „professor‟ in 
this paper. 
2 Keio university is regarded as a prestige university in Japan, 
3 This professor was dismissed as a committee member of the new bar examination 
and eventually resigned his position as professor (Nihon Keizai Newspaper 2007a).  
This is the first time that a member of the committee, for either the old or new bar , 
has been dismissed. 
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the evidence from the US of high stakes testing provided by Jacob and Levitt (2003). 
That is, that unexpected distortions such as cheating are induced depending on how 
the incentive systems are schemed, which is theoretically explained by general 
incentive theories, particularly the notion of multi-tasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991)4.   
The inception of the new bar examination is predicted to greatly affect not only 
the market structure of the legal profession but also Japan‟s legal education system 
(Lawley 2005).  As well, the unfairness resulting from the professors cheating would 
be induced by the way of the committee members are selected and by the rise of 
competitive pressure, both caused by institutional shortcomings.   Thus it appears 
important to assess the effect of the policies regarding the institutional change of the 
bar examination and the launching of many new law schools. It is also necessary to 
explore how and why the incidents of cheating occurred so that fairness can be restored 
to the examination.  Although a number of reports about legal education reform and 
Japan‟s new law schools have been presented by lawyers (e.g., Chan 2005, Foote 2005, 
Nishida 2005, Nottage 2005, Omura et al. 2005, Saegusa and Dierkes 2005, Steele 
2005, Taylor 2005), there is little, with the exception of Kinoshita (2000, 2002), that 
analyzes the influence of the reforms from an economic view point5.  Accordingly, this 
research uses data of the 2006 and 2007 bar examinations to find the determinants of 
the pass rates for various law schools, and to ascertain the effect of the rate of 
professor committee members. The mechanism of the current system of the new bar 
examination is also analyzed to show how it impedes the market for law schools.     
       The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section II provides an overview of 
the bar examination reforms and background. A cursory examination is made of the 
new bar examination results to see how the committee member ratios contribute to the 
pass rate.  Section III presents a simple econometric framework.  The results of the 
estimations and discussion are provided in Section IV.  The final section offers 
                                                   
4 Recently, besides the case of the new bar examination, a growing number of 
undesired distortions stemming from competitive pressure on schools and teachers 
have been detected in Japan.  For instance, since 2004 the Adachi ward in Tokyo has 
held an localized achievement test and then announced the results of each school; this 
resulted in a schoolmaster to oversee a system of cheating to gain a high score for their 
school (Nihon Keijzai Newspaper 2007b, 2007c).  As well, an examination related to 
gaining a teacher‟s license was leaked with the aim of improving the pass rate (Asahi 
Newspaper 2007 a, Ichikawa 2007).  Many high schools skipped teaching the 
compulsory subjects that are not directly related to the university entrance 
examination (Ariyoshi et al. 2007).    
5 Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2007) investigate whether Japanese courts experienced 
problems related to recruiting and resignations after the political turmoil in 1993.  
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concluding observations and some policy implications.   
 
 II. OVERVIEW OF THE BAR EXAMINATION REFORMS 
 
A. Background to the new bar examination 
  It was well known that the number of judicial professionals such as judges, public 
prosecutors, and attorneys was scarce in Japan compared with other developed 
countries, mainly due to the strict regulation of the market for lawyers6.  The strict 
regulation appeared to result in a great loss for the Japanese economy (Kinoshita 
2000).  The Justice System Reform Council (JSRC) was established by the 
government to study basic policies and programs for the purpose of making the justice 
system more familiar and accessible to the general public7.  In 2001, the Council 
issued an opinion paper calling for fundamental reforms;, this represented a transition 
from “small-scale justice” to “large-scale justice” and sought to extend the rule of law to 
all of society.  One specific issue of judicial reform was to realize a substantial 
augmentation of the number of people working in the legal profession.  The policy 
would be relevant to the emergence of various new types of conflicts concerning 
commercial enterprises, medical treatment, construction work, and so on (Yamada 
2002)8.   
     Based on the 2001 opinion report, new law schools commenced operation from 1 
April 2004.  In the case of the old bar examination of Japan, candidates were usually 
law majors and had laid made plans for the bar examination when they were 
undergraduates.   However, in response to the latent demand for new legal services 
from many sections of modern Japanese society, these new schools were designed to be 
open to graduates from any field, and welcomed those who were already working.  
This would enable individuals with backgrounds in business, government or other 
professions to develop more specialized legal careers based on their prior work 
experience.  Most students took the standard course (Mishu Course) with a training 
term of three years.  Students who possessed sufficient knowledge of the law were 
permitted to enter a special course (Kishu course) where the program could be 
completed in two years.  Accordingly, applicants for the new law examination in 2006, 
                                                   
6 In 2001, the number of judicial professionals was 21,000 in Japan, while there were 
36,000 in France and Britain, whose populations are each about half that of Japan 
(The daily Yomiuri 2001).  
7 For more detail, see the web site of JFBA. 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/judicial_system.html 
8 In recent years there has been a rapid expansion of foreign law firms operations in 
Japan, which has also increased the demand for new types of lawyers (Chan 2005). 
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the first to be held would be those who had completed the special course, meaning that 
the number of applicants for the 2006 examination was predicted to be small.  That is 
to say, a full-scale new examination, which would include students from both the 
special and standard courses, would be held in 2007.  The total numbers of examinees 
and successful applicants were 2,087 and 1,009, respectively, in 2006 and 4,607 and 
1,851, respectively, in 2007. 
     The JSRC originally called on law school administrators to provide a legal 
education that would be comprehensive enough that about “70 to 80 %” of candidate 
students would pass the new bar examination (JSRC 2001).  This anticipated pass 
rate was far higher than that of the previous law examination, of approximately 2-3%, 
and therefore was expect to encourage university students to invest more effort to 
become judicial professionals.  The JSRC set the objective of raising the number of 
applicants allowed to pass the new bar examination to 1,500 in 2004 and 3,000 by 2010, 
with the aim of achieving a total of approximately 50,000 judicial professionals by 2018 
(JSRC 2001).  This implied that the total number of judicial professionals in 2018 
would be more than twice that of 2001, which would result in a substantial increase in 
the net benefit to Japan9. In fact, once the new law school system was formally 
launched, most of Japan‟s major universities rushed to establish a law school, 
presumably because they felt that they could not maintain their previous grades and 
might lose their prestigious social evaluation without a new law school (Yamada 2002, 
p.49).  Consequently, a larger number of schools were built than had originally been 
expected.  Prior to the 2006 examination, the JSRC announced that the anticipated 
pass rate in 2005 would be approximately 50 %, which was far smaller than initially 
planned (Kakumu 2005).   The actual pass rates for 2006 and 2007 turned out to be 
48 % and 40%, respectively.  
      Prior to inception of the new law schools, applicants in the past tended to rely 
greatly on a preparatory school system that specialized in “teaching to the test”, not on 
a university curriculum that would not be relevant to the „old‟ bar examination 
(Yamada 2002). The original plan for the new system aimed to decrease the influence of 
preparatory schools (Kakumu 2005).  Whether applicants passed or failed the new bar 
examination would, depend on the method of education and the guidance from 
lecturers at the law schools, in combination with the students‟ own efforts and ability, 
especially when the pass rate declined.  The most important thing was for the schools 
to offer a quality education that would enable students to pass the examination.  
                                                   
9 Kinoshita (2002) indicated that net increase of total benefit per year is about 
0.12-0.6 % of GDP if the civil service of the Japanese district courts were to be doubled. 
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Hence, contrary to the original plan, professors would be more likely to shift away from 
non-tested areas or increased placement in special education, and end up, as before, 
merely “teaching to the test” (Jacob 2002).  Inevitably, law schools turned out to be 
just quasi-preparatory schools (Ishiwatari 2006). 
    Prior to the first new examination being conducted, besides members of the 
committees, professors were unable to obtain definite information concerning the form 
and tendency for the problem set in the new bar examination.    As well, in the new 
bar examination, a concrete marking standard has not even been publicly announced 
(Yonekura 2007). Therefore, professors cannot easily offer classes focusing on “teaching 
to the test,” even if they are willing to do so because they lack the basic information 
required for this which would allow them to shift away from non-tested areas.   This 
is probably why professors had to undertake teaching classes utilizing their sense, 
given thie appreciation of the highly competitive pressure.  Accordingly, it appears 
impossible to have judged whether the methods and syllabus plans of the law schools 
were suitable to taking the examination, or to evaluate qualities of the various 
education plans when the new law schools were launched.  From an applicant‟s view 
point, when they chose the law school they will apply to, only the school fees are 
apparent, without information of the educational quality offered to pass the 
examination.    As a consequence, the larger the demands for law school are, the 
lower the school fees be10.  Hence, top students might enter a law school whose fee is 
low, thus its pass rate could be expected to be high.  It is widely acknowledged that 
the fees of the national law schools are lower than private ones, leading them to have 
pass rates of higher than private schools partly because of their better students.    
 
B. Results and committee of new bar examination 
  Members of the new bar examination committee that is the responsible for setting 
and marking examination are appointed by the Ministry of Justice Members were 
selected from jurists such as public persecutors, attorneys, and university professor, 
including those from the new law schools (Ministry of justice 2005, 2006, 2007).  
Professors usually specialize in a specific area, within their major subject, and they 
appear to favor this field when they teach students at law schools and also when they 
set questions for the new bar examination.  Such conditions ensure that questions 
tend to be closely related to the contents of these professor‟s lectures, even if they do 
                                                   
10 A scholarship would decrease the cost that students pay even if tuition fees are high.  
As most law schools offer scholarships (Nikkei Career Magazine 2006, 2007), the 
influence of scholarships is considered small.     
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not intend to “teach to the test”.  As a consequence, students who are able to take 
lectures from committee members have a great advantage when they take the 
examination.  Furthermore, the system for selecting committee member could be one 
reason that the new law school professors who were also members of the committee 
were able to legitimately acquire accurate information about examination prior to the 
examination date.   The unexpected competitive environment, as previously 
mentioned, seems to have increased the incentive for professors on the committee to 
put some emphasis in their lectures on particular areas scheduled to be in the 
examination.  In fact, besides the case of a Keio University Law School member of the 
committee who informed his students about the content of the new bar examination in 
2007, some similar unfair cases where committee members gave special lectures at law 
schools have been reported (Asahi Newspaper 2007 e).  I see from table 1 that the 
ratio of professors among the committee members is between 20-30%, indicating that 
the effects of committee member on the results of the examination cannot be ignored. 
In more detail, the subjects of the new bar examination can be roughly divided 
into compulsory common subjects and selective ones.  All students must take the 7 
compulsory common subjects and select one subject from among 8 selective subjects11. 
Even in a law school employing a committee member as a professor, the advantage of 
selective subjects might be limited to those students who select it, whereas all students 
can enjoy benefits concerning common subjects.  Therefore, a committee member 
specializing in compulsory common subjects is expected to have a greater effect on 
examination pass rates than a professor specializing in a selective subject.   
      Looking at Table 2(a) reveals that the number of successful candidates and the 
pass rates of the new bar examination are significantly higher in law schools that have 
committee members on their staff than those schools without such staff members.  
Thirty-nine law schools have a committee member on their staff, 87do not.  
 It is widely known that the “big five”, the University of Tokyo and Kyoto 
University, regarded as the leading national universities, and Waseda, Keio, and Chuo 
University, the leading private universities, produced a large number of successful 
candidates for the “old bar examination” (Omura et al. 2005).  As well, many lawyers 
graduated from Hitotsubashi University, which is also considered a leading university.  
In this paper, these 6 universities are defined as the “prestigious universities”.  This 
                                                   
11 7 compulsory common subjects comprise constitutional law, administrative law, 
commercial law, civil law, civil procedure law, criminal law, and criminal procedure 
law.   . The 8 selective subjects are taxation law, labor law, international law, 
international private law, economic law, bankruptcy law, environment law, and 
intellectual property law. 
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might be a result of the quality and focus of their students rather than to the quality of 
their education, since most students still relied heavily on preparatory schools.  On 
the other hand, most of the influential and capable professors are thought to be 
concentrated in these universities.  Table 2 (b) tells me that the numbers and success 
rates of candidates from these prestigious university law schools are significantly 
larger and higher than for other schools.  Numbers of successful candidates from 
these universities are nearly 9 times larger than other schools, even though this might 
partly be thanks to the large number of applicants.  After controlling for this scale 
effect, their pass rate is approximately twice that of the other schools.  The fact that 
the number of committee members from national university law schools is greater than 
those from private universities can be seen in Table 3 (a).  This tendency remains 
when just law schools with committee members are analyzed; suggesting that 
committee members are more likely to be selected from national universities.   When 
we compare the prestigious university law schools with all others in Table 3 (b), the 
very surprising result that the number of committee members from the prestigious 
schools is nearly 20 times greater than those from the others.  It is also noteworthy 
that if samples are restricted to law schools with committee members, the rate of 
committee members from prestigious schools is approximately three times that of the 
others.   Taking these results together, the dominance of the prestigious university 
law schools might be partly thanks to the advantage of having committee members on 
their staff. 
 
 III. ESTIMATED MODEL AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  
 A. Data  
     The data set used in this study is at the law school level data from 2006 and 2007.  
Table 4 includes variable definitions, means, standard deviations, and maximum and 
minimums of analyzed data.  The variables are discussed later.  The pass rate is the 
number of successful candidates over that of total examinees12.  Tuition fees are 
collated from the Nikkei Career Magazine (2005, 2006).  The ratios of professors 
committee members, those specializing in compulsory common subjects and those in 
selective subjects are each a variable over the total number of full-time professors; data 
obtained from the Ministry of Justice (2005, 2006) and the Nikkei Career Magazine 
(2005, 2006).  Aggregated numbers of successful applicants for the old bar 
                                                   
12 The data of 2006 is available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/h18-04kekka.pdf.  That of 2007 is at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/h19kekka01-6.pdf 
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examination during the period 2000-2005 were collated from Asahi Newspaper 
Publishing (various years).   Per capita GDP where a law school is located was 
derived from the Index Corporation (2006).   
     I see from Table 4 that the pass rates ranged from 0% to 100%; clearly indicating 
that there is large gas among the performances of the various law schools.  This might 
partly relate to the remarkable difference in the ratio of committee members of 
between 0 % and 22.8 %; as mentioned previously, professors who are committee 
members are positively related to the pass rate. 
 
B.  Function form 
  Following from the discussion above, the estimated function of the pass rate 
takes the following form13: 
 
PASRAT it= 0 +1TUITit +2COMRATit + 3RIVALit  + 4NATIOi + 5NPASi 
6PGDPit +ωit , 
where PASRAT represents the pass rate of a law school i in year t, and ‟s represents 
the regression parameters. ωit represents the error term.  Added to the simple OLS 
model, a sample selection model (Heckman model) is also employed to control for 
selection bias since there were no applicants from 10 law schools for the 2006 
examination and from 6 in 2007 14 .   With the exception of dummy variables, 
dependent and independent variables are evaluated at the sample means and 
therefore coefficient values reported can be interpreted as elasticity15.   
Following from the discussion in the previous section, TUIT stands for tuition and 
                                                   
13 Besides dummy variables, the values of coefficients can be interpreted as the 
elasticity of the number of victims with respect to the corresponding independent 
variables, which are evaluated at the sample mean values of the variables.   
14 Probit and OLS estimations are calculated simultaneously in a Heckman model.  
Independent variables in Probit estimations are TUIT, COMRAT, NATIO, NPAS and 
the total number of full-time professors.  The reason why the total number of full-time 
professors is included in the Probit estimation but not in the OLS estimation is that 
the large scale of the law schools seems to reduce the likelihood that nobody takes the 
examination would not directly affect the pass rate. 
15 See more details for Greene (Greene1997, p.280). 
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is predicted to be negative if scarcity of information concerning education quality leads 
to an increase in demand for law schools with low tuition, resulting in excellent 
students concentrating in low tuition law schools.  COMRAT represents the rate of 
committee members and is incorporated to capture the effect of committee members on 
the pass rate and is expected to take a positive sign if a committee member makes a 
contribution to raising the pass rate.  RIVAL denotes the number of other law schools 
belonging to the same prefecture and is considered to be a proxy for the substitute, and 
therefore its sign becomes negative.  NATIO is the national university‟s law school 
dummy and controls for the characteristics of a law school.   NPAS represents the 
aggregated number of successful applicants for the old bar examination during the 
past six years and examines how prestigious universities dominated both the old bar 
examination and continued to do so for  the new bar one.  Because of scarcity of 
information concerning educational quality, the brand is considered to signal high 
quality even if such a “brand” is not because of the educational quality but to the 
quality of students.  The “brand” effect can be why top students are more inclined to 
enter the law schools of prestigious university‟s and thus NPAS is expected to be 
positive.   PGDP stands for per capital GDP where the law school is located and 
would take a positive sign since higher income would lead to higher investment for the 
examination; as well, students living in more urban areas are more likely to access 
useful information partly because preparatory schools are concentrated there16.  This 
is because preparatory schools are considered to be complementary to law schools, 
rather than a substitute (Yonekura 2007).   
 Alternative specification incorporates prestigious law school dummies, instead of 
NATIO and NPAS, to explore how educational quality is related to the pass rate.  
Most law schools including the renowned private law schools such as Waseda, Keio and 
Chuo attempt to offer courses suitable for the examination to raise their pass rate 
while prestigious laws schools of national universities such as Tokyo, Kyoto and 
Hitotsubashi are less likely to do so, although competitive pressure will induce a law 
school to “teach to the test” (Ishiwatari 2006).  On the other hand, the high ratio of 
committee members from these prestigious national and private law schools seems to 
be positively associated with their high pass rates.   Accordingly, the high pass rate of 
                                                   
16 There are differences between law schools' stated principles which decrease 
influence of preparatory schools and their real intentions. A number of law schools 
ordered the preparatory school located in Tokyo to give professors a lecture on the 
know-how of passing new bar examination (Ida 2007).  To this end, law schools 
located in urban area can enjoy its proximity to the urban center in which preparatory 
schools concentrate. 
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the national prestigious schools appears to the result of the high ratio of committee 
members, rather that to examination oriented education.  Hence, after controlling for 
COMRAT, dummies for private schools such as WASEDA, KEIO, and CHUO are 
expected to become positive, but those for national ones such as TOKYO, KYOTO, and 
HITOT are ambiguous. 
I now proceed to discuss the determinants of the ratio of committee members; its 
estimated function then takes the following form: 
 
COMRAT it= 0 +1NATIOi +2NPASi + 3PGDPit  +ωit , 
 
   As discussed previously, the ratio of committee members is higher in national 
law schools and the renowned private universities i compared with the others, and 
therefore the sign of NATIO and NPAS would be positive.  PGDP is included to control 
for economic factors. Alternative specification incorporates prestigious law school 
dummies instead of NATIO and NPAS to examine how and to what extent prestigious 
law schools dominate.  The data is censored since there are a number of samples 
where COMRAT is 0, leading to an estimation bias.  The Tobit estimation allows me to 
subdue this bias.  Hence, OLS as well as Tobit estimations are employed. 
    
IV. RESULTS 
A.  Pass rate 
Table 5 sets out the results of pass rate estimations using aggregated data from 
2006 and 2007.  As mentioned in Section II, the first full-scale examination was held 
in 2007 since applicants in 2006 was restricted to students who completed the two 
years special course.   Therefore, features of the 2006 examination were different 
from those in 2007.  With the aim of comparing the 2006 and 2007 results, Tables 6 
and 7 present the results of 2006 and 2007, respectively.   Columns (1), (3), and (5) 
present the results of OLS estimations and those of (2), (4), and (6) provide Heckman 
estimations, respectively. 
Looking at table 5 reveals that the coefficients of TUIT and RIVAL become 
negative and therefore have significantly negative effects on the pass rate in all 
specifications, which is in line with my prediction.  The elasticity of the pass rate with 
respect to TUIT ranges between - 0.43 and - 0.76, implying that the pass rate falls to 
between 0.43 and 0.76 % when tuition rises by 1 %.  The signs of COMRAT are 
positive and are statistically significant at the 1 % level in all estimations.  Its 
coefficient values take 0.06 and 0.07, meaning that the pass rate rises between 0.06 
12 
 
and 0.07 when the ratio of committee members increases by 1 %.  It follows from this 
that professors who are also committee members make a contribution to the pass rate.  
Consistent with the anticipation, the coefficients of NPAS  and PGDP take 
significantly positive signs in all estimations.  I derived the argument from the results 
of NPAS that the dominance in the old bar examination in the past years was 
maintained in the new examination.  Does this dominance come from the “brand” as 
discussed in the prior section?  To follow this up, I look at the results of the prestigious 
university dummies.  As presented in columns (3) and (4), after controlling for the 
committee member effect presented, I find it surprising that the prestigious national 
law schools dummies such as TOKYO, KYOTO, and HITOT are not statistically 
significant, despite taking positive signs, whereas those of prestigious private ones 
such as WASE, KEIO, and CHUO take significantly positive signs.  Furthermore, the 
coefficients of the national universities dummies, approximately 0.15, are smaller than 
private ones, which range between 0.20 and 0.28 17 .  It is recognized that the 
University of Tokyo is the most prestigious university in Japan (Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen 2007).  These lead me to argue that, contrary to anticipation, the “brand” 
effect does not make a contribution to the pass rate.  As shown in columns (5) and (6), 
the results when the committee member effect is not controlled for shows that not only 
private but also national prestigious dummies take significantly positive signs. 
Further, the coefficient values of private school dummies in columns (5) and (6) are 
larger than those in (3) and (4), meaning that committee member leverage the 
advantage of private ones.  Considering this together with Table 3(b), I interpret 
these results as suggesting that the advantage of national prestigious universities 
stems only from the high ratio of committee members while that of private ones come 
from committee members as well as the educational quality. 
I now turn to more closely examine Tables 6 and 7. These two tables tell me that 
variables, with the exception of TUIT, NPAS, and some prestigious school dummies, 
are hardly statistically significant although all signs of the coefficients are the same as 
in Table 5.  This might presumably be because most of the applicants in 2006 had 
experienced the old bar examination and so learned at preparatory schools in advance 
(Ida and Yatsu 2006).  Therefore their success largely depended on the education 
gained at preparatory schools, rather than on law schools where they learnt for only for 
two years.  Turning to Table 7, the results are similar to those in Table 5 in terms of 
the coefficient signs and statistical significance.   Comparing Tables 6 and 7, it is 
                                                   
17 After controlling for various factors, the pass rate of the private prestigious law 
schools is higher by 20% to 28% that of non-prestigious law schools. 
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remarkable that the values of COMRAT raging between 0.11 and 0.13 are 
approximately 10 times larger than those in Table 6, implying that the ratio of 
committee members hardly affected the pass rate in 2006 but played a substantial role 
in raising it in 2007.  It is also interesting to observe that KEIO and CHUO become 
statistically significant in Table 7, even though they are insignificant in Table 6.  I 
interpret this as supporting the conjecture that raising the competitive pressure 
induced professors to offer distortional educational courses such as “teaching to the 
test” along with more effective education18.     
 I now proceed to subject the findings from the data concerning the effect of 
committee members on the pass rate to more careful scrutiny.  As stated earlier, 
committee members are divided into those specializing in compulsory common subjects 
and those in selective subjects. The former are expected to have a larger effect on the 
pass rate since all students are obliged to take these subjects.  CCOMRAT and 
SCOMRAT stand for the ratio of members from the compulsory common subjects and 
from the selective ones, respectively.  Table 8 presents the results of estimations, in 
which CCOMRAT and SCOMRAT are incorporated in the function instead of COMRAT.  
I focus on CCOMRAT and SCOMRAT.  Columns (1)-(4) indicate the results of 
aggregated data from 2006 and 2007 and reveal that all coefficients of CCOMRAT are 
significantly positive whereas those of SCOMRAT are insignificant despite being 
positive.  What is more, the coefficient values of CCOMRAT are twice that of 
CCOMRAT.  As expected previously, it is evident that members from the compulsory 
common subjects have a greater effect on the pass rate than those from the selective 
subjects.  Columns (5)-(8) indicate the results from 2006 and tell me that, contrary to 
my anticipation, the coefficients of CCOMRAT become negative whereas those of 
SCOMRAT continue to be positive.  It follows from this that CCOMRAT and 
SCOMRAT hardly affect the pass rate, which is in line with results of Table 6.  I see 
from columns (9)-(12), showing the results of 2007, that all coefficients of CCOMRAT 
are positive and significant at the 1 %, whereas those of SCOMRAT are insignificant 
despite being positive.  I found it surprising that the magnitudes of CCOMRAT, which 
take between 0.09 and 0.10, are from 3 to 10 times larger than for SCOMRAT.  In new 
bar examination, examinees select one of the selective subjects while they are obliged 
to take all 7 common subjects and hence the effect of common subjects is expected to 
have a 7 times larger one than a selective subject.  This expectation is considered to 
be in line with the estimation results in 2007. 
                                                   
18 It also seems plausible that it might take three years at least for distortions as well 
as the educational quality to raise the pass rate. 
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Thus it is evident that the inclusion of committee members from the common 
subjects has a far larger effect than inclusion of members specializing in a selective 
subject.   
 
B.  Ratio of committee members 
Table 9 sets out the results of the ratio of committee members.  In line with Table 
3(a), the coefficients of NATIO, NPAS, and PGDP take positive signs and are almost 
statistically significant at the 1 % level, suggesting that national and renowned law 
schools located in an urban area have great advantages for employing a committee 
members as a professor.    Turning to the prestigious law school dummies, all their 
coefficients are positive.  I see from column (4), presenting the aggregated results of 
2006 and 2007, that the ratios of committee members from national prestigious law 
schools are 14-22% higher than for those from non prestigious law schools, while those 
from private one are 8-11% higher.  On closer examination, the results of 2006 and 
2007 as separately exhibited in columns (5) and (6) reveal that national prestigious 
schools such as TOKYO, KYOTO, and HITOT are mostly statistically significant, 
whereas those of private schools are insignificant.  What is more, the values of the 
national schools are larger than those of the private ones.  In 2006, the committee 
members ratios of Tokyo University, Kyoto University and Hitotsubashi University 
were 12%, 14%, and 15%, respectively, higher than for non-prestigious universities, 
while in 2007 the figures were 15%, 28 % and 24 %, respectively.  It follows from this 
that the advantage gained by national schools became more obvious in 2007 than it 
was n 2006.     
  Taking into account Table 3(b), and Tables 8 and 9 jointly, it needs to be 
emphasized that as far as the regression results of 2007 are concerned, committee 
members are concentrated in the renowned law schools, which, in turn, affects their 
pass rate.  In particular, in the case of the national prestigious law schools, they did 
not offer quality education aimed at passing but could record high pass rates mainly 
because a number of the committee members also acted as professors at their law 
school.  Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that in national universities, professors 
are inclined to teach students to avoid „teaching to the test‟ since they consider such 
quasi-preparatory school teaching method to be improper in law school education, even 
though there is ever increasing competitive pressure on law schools.  This tendency is 
more pronounced for a prestigious university such as Tokyo and Kyoto Universities, 
leading to a lower pass rate than anticipated in advance (Ishiwatari 2006).  If this is 
the case, the professor committee members are less likely to inform their students 
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about the content of the examination.  The results of estimations, however, are 
obviously contradictory to this.  In my interpretation, the area in which a professor 
has sufficient knowledge to appropriately set questions and can give a full and 
particular account is limited and narrow.  Necessarily, professors are inclined to set 
questions for the bar examination within their particular specialized area and so will 
also focus on it during the law school lectures even if they do not have an incentive to 
deliberately pass on confidential information.   Inevitably, the question they set turns 
out to be profoundly related to their law school syllabus, leading to an increase in the 
likelihood that the questions for the new bar examination are in accordance with the 
matter that students intensively studied.  As a result, professor committee members 
facilitate a form of cheating, perhaps without intention; though this can be seen as an 
outcome of the current system of selecting committee members.  
 
C.  Discussion 
As mentioned previously, compared with private university law schools, national 
universities are less likely to offer distortional education such as lecture on the 
know-how and techniques required to pass the examination (Ishiwsatari 2006).  This 
is presumably because national universities did not confront the possibility so that 
lecturers might not have been aware of any crisis.   Nevertheless, the recent 
condition of national universities has been drastically changed since they all became 
independent administrative corporations19.   
According to Nishida, a professor of Okayama University law school, in a 
non-urban national university, the numbers of law schools and students are high so 
that graduates who cannot be legal professionals might be created; thus he expects 
that at least one-third of the current law schools will close within the next ten years 
(Nishida 2005).  Necessarily, national law schools will be induced to improve their 
educational quality and systems in order to raise the pass rate since whether a law 
school survives might depend upon their pass rate for the new bar examination.   
Eventually, not only private but also national law schools professors seem to have 
shared the similar opinion about the improvement of the education system.  The 
market for law school education will become competitive, resulting in an efficient 
outcome even if this is contrary to the principle of law schools20.  Further, this 
                                                   
19 The change was based upon the National University Corporation Law on 1 April. 
2004. 
20 The Japan Law Foundation, which is one of organs certifying and evaluating law 
schools, did not confirm that Aichi University law school fitted the requirements; this 
was the first time for such a decision, on March 26, 2008.  This was mainly because 
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outcome is not considered to be undesirable from an economics point of view of and a 
betrayal of trust in the examination system as a matter of fairness.    The true 
nature of the problem is that the method of selecting committee members favors the 
prestigious law schools, thereby hindering law schools from competing fairly.   
Accordingly, non-prestigious law schools will exit one after another, which would 
eventually mean that the law school market becomes an oligopoly since only 
prestigious law schools will be able to survive in such a market.   What is more, the 
fairness of the new bar examination will essentially be lost.  In short, not only the 
benefits stemming from a competitive mechanism but also the fairness of the 
examination itself will be lost; all of which can be viewed as outcomes resulting from 
the inclusion of law school professors as committee members.  
It is appropriate to call on the Justice Ministry to not appoint committee 
members from the ranks of professors and to prohibit committee members from 
lecturing in law schools.  In accordance with this, a plan to reduce the number of 
professors appointed as committee members has been announced (Asahi Newspaper 
2007c).  This scheme has, however, failed to be reflected in the actual conditions.  As 
shown in Table 1the ratio of professors to total committee members actually increased 
by approximately 10 % in 2008. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
      
     The inauguration of the new bar examination has been designed to bring about 
benefits to modern Japanese society by providing for larger number of lawyers with 
specialized legal careers based on a wide rage of backgrounds. This was in response to 
highly specialized and complicated circumstances in Japan and to movements towards 
globalization.  New law schools are anticipated to focus on legal qualification through 
a „process‟ of legal education; therefore, differing from the previous system, which in 
effect just evaluated an applicants‟ skill to pass the examination.  Nevertheless, a 
situation that was contrary to the original purpose of the new system was realized 
after its introduction.  A proliferation of new law schools increased the competitive 
pressure on professors to raise the law school‟s pass rate for the purpose of enabling 
the law school to survive„ resulting in the professors been given an incentive to cheat.   
Consequently, a scandal occurred in 2007 in which a professor offered his students 
prepared answers and explained points similar to those he knew would appear in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
this law school offered lectures that strongly focusing on the examination 
(http://www.jlf.or.jp/work/dai3sha/aichi_report2007.pdf).   
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examination.  I considered that such a scandal was caused by the shortcomings of the 
new system; therefore, I attempted to investigate how and to what extent the new 
system hampered the desired market for new law schools.     
After controlling for various factors, the major findings through OLS and Heckman 
Estimations are as follows:  
 (1)Elasticity of the pass rate with respect to the ratio of committee members is 
positive. The elasticity for 2007 was more significant and larger than that for 
2006.  More precisely, committee members specializing in the common subjects 
have a larger and more significant affect on the pass rate than those specializing 
in a selective subject. 
 (2)  National as well as private prestigious law schools realized high pass rates. The 
high rates of national prestigious law schools are mainly thanks to the high ratio 
of professor committee members, while the rate of private schools is partly due to 
the ratio. 
 (3) As a whole, the ratio of committee members of national prestigious law schools are 
14-22% higher than that for non prestigious law schools, while those of private 
one are 8-11% higher at most.   
Considering al the estimation results together, I feel it appropriate to remark 
that the prestigious universities enjoy the benefits of a high ratio of committee 
members since professor committee members can take advantage of their information 
about the examination when there is an incentive to „teach to the test‟ .  In short, the 
method by which committee members are selected contributes to raising the pass rates 
of prestigious law schools, leading to impeding the market for law schools and to 
reducing the likelihood that non-prestigious law schools will survive.  The reason why 
such an undesired outcome can take place is that professors belonging to the 
committee are apt to cheat under the strong competitive pressure compared with the 
system governing the previous bar examination.  This mechanism is tied to the claim 
in that high-powered incentive schemes are likely to induce behavior distortions (Jacob 
and Levitt, 2003).  The outcome will be unchanged even if professors do not have an 
incentive to cheat.  Professors will usually carry out the research in a somewhat 
specialized field, rather than a comprehensive one;, something that is reflected in the 
numerous academic journal in the field of economics21.  Thus, the field in which a 
professor is specialized and in which they are able give a full and particular lecture, is 
thus limited and specific.  Inevitably contents of lectures might be associated with a 
                                                   
21 In the case of economics, Econ Lit, a well-known data-base of the field of economics, 
contains approximately 1,400 journals(http://www.econlit.org/journal_list.html). 
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question set by the professor for the examination.  This can be seen in that professors 
give lectures profoundly related to the content of examination they have set even they 
have no intention of cheating.   
 To make market function well and also to prevent professors from cheating as 
well as bringing back fairness to the new bar examination, the Ministry of Justice 
should at least not appoint professors from law schools as committee members. 
The present remarkable low birth rate in Japan has decreased the demand for 
education facilities; however, the number of universities continues to increase, leading 
to substantial competitive pressure within the educational industry.  A number of 
universities have faced difficulties and will not survive as a result of the increasing 
competitive pressure.  Some universities seem to have established a new law school as 
a part of their promotion programs.   A future direction for this study will be to 
explore how and to what extent the new bar examination system has an affect on the 
survival of the new law schools through the impediments placed on the law school 
market.  
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TABLE 1 
Ratio of professors of committee members (%) 
 Common subject Selective subject Total 
2006     30.9      25.0 28.0 
2007 20.5 25.0    21.7 
2008 28.2 37.5    31.3 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2005, 2006, 2007). 
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TABLE 2 
                    Comparison of successful candidates (2006 and 2007) 
 
(a) Comparison of successful candidate numbers and the pass rate between law schools 
with and without committee members 
 Committee Non-committee t-value 
Number of successful 
candidates 
54.1 
(39) 
8.5 
 (87) 
8.42** 
The pass rate (%) 
 
46.6 
(39) 
31.6 
 (87) 
4.28** 
 
 (b) Comparison of successful candidate numbers and the pass rate between 
prestigious and other universities. 
 Prestigious Other t-value 
Number of successful 
candidates 
109.4 
(12) 
13.5 
 (114) 
15.1** 
The pass rate (%) 
 
63.0 
(12) 
33.5 
 (114) 
5.58** 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2005, 2006, 2007). Nikkei Career Magazine (2006, 2007). 
Note: Values in parentheses are number of observations. ** means that difference is 
significant at the 1 % level.  
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TABLE 3 
Comparison of numbers of committee members  
(a) Comparison of numbers of committee members between national and private law 
schools 
 
 National Private t-value 
All sample 1.47 
(46) 
0.47 
     (102) 
3.32** 
Sample restricted to law schools 
with committee members 
3.57 
(19) 
2.18 
 (22) 
1.97* 
 
 (b) Comparison of numbers of committee members between Prestigious and other 
universities. 
 Prestigious Other t-value 
All sample 5.5 
(12) 
0.3 
 (114) 
15.9** 
Sample restricted to law schools 
with committee members 
5.5 
(12) 
1.72 
 (114) 
6.91** 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2005, 2006, 2007). 
Notes: Values in parentheses are number of observations. ** means that difference is 
significant at the 1 % level.  
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
PASRAT Pass rate (%) 
 
36 19 0 100 
TUIT Tuition (Thousands Yens) 
 
1,445 381 945 3000 
COMRAT Ratio of committee members to professors 
(%) 
2.2 4.4 0 22.8 
CCOMRAT Ratio of committee members of compulsory 
common subjects to professors (%) 
0.6 1.9 0 10.7 
SCOMRAT Ratio of committee members of selective 
subjects to professors (%) 
1.5 3.2 0 17.1 
RIVAL Number of other law schools belonging to 
the same prefecture 
7.4 8.0 0 20 
TOKYO 
 
Tokyo University Dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1 
KYOTO 
 
Kyoto University Dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1 
HITOT 
 
Hitotsubashi University Dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1 
WASE 
 
Waseda University Dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1 
KEIO 
 
Keio University Dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1 
CHUO 
 
Chuo University Dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1 
NATIO National university dummy 
 
0.31 0.46 0 1 
NPAS Aggregated number of successful applicants 
of old bar examination from 2000 to 2005. 
82 201 0 1104 
PGDP Per capita GDP of the prefecture to which 
law school belongs (Thousands Yens) 
3,315 700 2,048 4,333 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of pass rate (2006 and 2007) 
Variables (1)OLS 
 
(2)HECK 
 
(3)OLS 
 
(4)HECK 
 
(5)OLS 
 
(6)HECK 
 
TUIT 
 
-0.43* 
(-2.26) 
-0.43* 
(-2.29) 
-0.67** 
(-3.91) 
-0.67** 
(-4.02) 
-0.76** 
(-4.39) 
-0.76** 
(-4.45) 
COMRAT 
 
0.06** 
(2.35) 
0.05** 
(2.38) 
0.07** 
(2.58) 
0.06** 
(2.69) 
  
RIVAL 
 
-0.25* 
(-2.10) 
-0.23* 
(-2.19) 
-0.27* 
(-2.24) 
-0.25** 
(-2.36) 
-0.25* 
(-2.02) 
-0.23* 
(-2.14) 
TOKYO 
 
  0.14 
(1.19) 
0.14 
(1.25) 
0.23* 
(1.99) 
0.23* 
(2.09) 
KYOTO 
 
  0.12 
(1.04) 
0.12 
(1.09) 
0.27** 
(2.42) 
0.26** 
(2.52) 
HITOT 
 
  0.16 
(1.30) 
0.16 
(1.37) 
0.31** 
(2.75) 
0.31** 
(2.88) 
WASE 
 
  0.20* 
(1.82) 
0.20* 
(1.92) 
0.25* 
(2.23) 
0.25** 
(2.34) 
KEIO 
 
  0.28** 
(2.50) 
0.28** 
(2.63) 
0.35** 
(3.17) 
0.35** 
(3.31) 
CHUO 
 
  0.25* 
(2.30) 
0.25** 
(2.42) 
0.29** 
(2.60) 
0.29** 
(2.72) 
NATIO 
 
0.06 
(1.53) 
0.06 
(1.58) 
    
NPAS 
 
0.06** 
(3.09) 
0.05** 
(3.19) 
    
PGDP 
 
1.32** 
(3.75) 
1.30** 
(2.50) 
1.28* 
(2.32) 
1.26** 
(2.44) 
1.29* 
(2.28) 
1.27** 
(2.40) 
Censored 
Observations 
 16  16  16 
Number of 
Observations 
 126 142  126 142  126 142 
Notes:  Values are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is 
calculated by delta method.   Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means 
statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
Determinants of pass rate (2006) 
Variables (1)OLS 
 
(2)HECK 
 
(3)OLS 
 
(4)HECK 
 
(5)OLS 
 
(6)HECK 
 
TUIT 
 
-0.47 
(-1.40) 
-0.53 
(-1.54) 
-0.78** 
(-2.48) 
-0.83** 
(-2.61) 
-0.80** 
(-2.61) 
-0.85** 
(-2.69) 
COMRAT 
 
0.02 
(0.55) 
0.01 
(0.53) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
  
RIVAL 
 
-0.28 
(-1.26) 
-0.24 
(-1.28) 
-0.32 
(-1.43) 
-0.29 
(-1.55) 
-0.31 
(-1.41) 
-0.28 
(-1.51) 
TOKYO 
 
  0.20 
(0.84) 
0.19 
(0.92) 
0.24 
(1.17) 
0.24 
(1.28) 
KYOTO 
 
  0.19 
(0.87) 
0.19 
(0.97) 
0.23 
(1.15) 
0.23 
(1.27) 
HITOT 
 
  0.31 
(1.19) 
0.30 
(1.31) 
0.36* 
(1.77) 
0.36* 
(1.94) 
WASE 
 
  0.27 
(1.37) 
0.27 
(1.52) 
0.28 
(1.41) 
0.28 
(1.55) 
KEIO 
 
  0.31 
(1.45) 
0.31 
(1.61) 
0.33* 
(1.68) 
0.33* 
(1.85) 
CHUO 
 
  0.29 
(1.42) 
0.29 
(1.58) 
0.29 
(1.47) 
0.29 
(1.62) 
NATIO 
 
0.10 
(1.30) 
0.11 
(1.52) 
    
NPAS 
 
0.06* 
(1.97) 
0.06* 
(2.09) 
    
PGDP 
 
1.36 
(1.47) 
1.45 
(1.63) 
1.39 
(1.44) 
1.39 
(1.59) 
1.40 
(1.47) 
1.40 
(1.60) 
Censored 
Observations 
 10  10  10 
Number of 
Observations 
 58 68  58 68  58 68 
Notes: Values are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is 
calculated by delta method.  Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means 
statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Determinants of pass rate (2007) 
Variables (1)OLS 
 
(2)HECK 
 
(3)OLS 
 
(4)HECK 
 
(5)OLS 
 
(6)HECK 
 
TUIT 
 
-0.44* 
(-2.11) 
-0.44* 
(-2.30) 
-0.58** 
(-3.19) 
-0.58** 
(-3.53) 
-0.74** 
(-3.70) 
-0.74** 
(-4.11) 
COMRAT 
 
0.11** 
(3.46) 
0.10** 
(3.29) 
0.13** 
(3.90) 
0.13** 
(4.15) 
  
RIVAL 
 
-0.21 
(-1.64) 
-0.19* 
(-1.78) 
-0.21 
(-1.63) 
-0.20* 
(-1.82) 
-0.18 
(-1.27) 
-0.18 
(-1.49) 
TOKYO 
 
  0.09 
(0.79) 
0.09 
(0.86) 
0.20 
(1.62) 
0.20* 
(1.73) 
KYOTO 
 
  0.03 
(0.26) 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.30** 
(2.46) 
0.30** 
(2.60) 
HITOT 
 
  0.02 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.25* 
(2.01) 
0.25* 
(2.14) 
WASE 
 
  0.10 
(0.91) 
0.10 
(1.00) 
0.21* 
(1.73) 
0.21* 
(1.86) 
KEIO 
 
  0.26* 
(2.26) 
0.26** 
(2.48) 
0.37** 
(2.99) 
0.37** 
(3.22) 
CHUO 
 
  0.22* 
(1.92) 
0.22* 
(2.11) 
0.29* 
(2.33) 
0.29** 
(2.52) 
NATIO 
 
0.02 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
    
NPAS 
 
0.05* 
(2.25) 
0.04** 
(2.43) 
    
PGDP 
 
1.19* 
(2.00) 
1.16* 
(2.12) 
1.14* 
(1.90) 
1.13* 
(2.10) 
1.14* 
(2.28) 
1.14* 
(1.91) 
Censored 
Observations 
 6  6  6 
Number of 
Observations 
 68 74  68 74  68 74 
Notes:  Values are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is 
calculated by delta method.  Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means 
statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 8 
Determinants of pass rate (2006 and 2007) 
Variables (1)OLS 
2006-07 
(2)HECK 
2006-07 
(3)OLS 
2006-07 
(4)HECK 
2006-07 
(5)OLS 
2006 
(6)HECK 
2006 
(7)OLS 
2006 
(8)HECK 
2006 
(9)OLS 
2007 
(10)HECK 
2007 
(11)OLS 
2007 
(12)HECK 
2007 
TUIT 
 
-0.43* 
(-2.20) 
-0.42* 
(-2.24) 
-0.67** 
(-3.89) 
-0.67** 
(-4.02) 
-0.44 
(-1.28) 
-0.49 
(-1.43) 
-0.78** 
(-2.45) 
-0.82** 
(-2.60) 
-0.45* 
(-2.13) 
-0.45* 
(-2.34) 
-0.58** 
(-3.16) 
-0.58** 
(-3.53) 
CCOMRAT 
 
0.04* 
(1.66) 
0.03** 
(1.67) 
0.04** 
(2.03) 
0.04* 
(2.13) 
-0.007 
(-0.21) 
-0.006 
(-0.21) 
-0.004 
(-0.12) 
-0.004 
(-0.13) 
0.10** 
(2.96) 
0.09** 
(2.84) 
0.10** 
(3.23) 
0.10** 
(3.48) 
SCOMRAT 
 
0.02 
(1.34) 
0.02 
(1.39) 
0.02 
(1.15) 
0.02 
(1.21) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(0.90) 
0.01 
(0.94) 
0.03 
(1.04) 
0.02 
(1.15) 
RIVAL 
 
-0.26* 
(-2.10) 
-0.24* 
(-2.20) 
-0.27* 
(-2.21) 
-0.25** 
(-2.34) 
-0.29 
(-1.32) 
-0.26 
(-1.35) 
-0.33 
(-1.47) 
-0.30 
(-1.61) 
-0.19 
(-1.49) 
-0.18* 
(-1.65) 
-0.20 
(-1.56) 
-0.19* 
(-1.75) 
TOKYO 
 
  0.13 
(1.14) 
0.13 
(1.20) 
  0.21 
(0.89) 
0.21 
(0.99) 
  0.09 
(0.77) 
0.09 
(0.84) 
KYOTO 
 
  0.12 
(1.03) 
0.12 
(1.09) 
  0.22 
(0.97) 
0.22 
(1.09) 
  0.03 
(0.27) 
0.03 
(0.30) 
HITOT 
 
  0.15 
(1.09) 
0.15 
(1.16) 
  0.28 
(1.07) 
0.28 
(1.19) 
  0.03 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.22) 
WASE 
 
  0.20* 
(1.82) 
0.20* 
(1.92) 
  0.28 
(1.39) 
0.28 
(1.56) 
  0.10 
(0.90) 
0.10 
(1.00) 
KEIO 
 
  0.28** 
(2.48) 
0.28** 
(2.62) 
  0.34 
(1.51) 
0.34* 
(1.70) 
  0.26* 
(2.24) 
0.26** 
(2.47) 
CHUO 
 
  0.25* 
(2.27) 
0.25** 
(2.40) 
  0.31 
(1.48) 
0.31* 
(1.66) 
  0.21* 
(1.85) 
0.22* 
(2.05) 
NATIO 
 
0.06 
(1.52) 
0.06 
(1.58) 
  0.10 
(1.35) 
0.12 
(1.58) 
  0.02 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
  
NPAS 
 
0.06** 
(3.08) 
0.05** 
(3.20) 
  0.07* 
(2.07) 
0.06* 
(2.20) 
  0.05* 
(2.25) 
0.04** 
(2.41) 
  
PGDP 
 
1.33** 
(2.44) 
1.31** 
(2.51) 
1.28* 
(2.31) 
1.27** 
(2.44) 
1.39 
(1.49) 
1.48* 
(1.67) 
1.43 
(1.46) 
1.42 
(1.63) 
1.16* 
(1.92) 
1.14* 
(2.07) 
1.13* 
(1.85) 
1.12* 
(2.06) 
Censored 
Observations 
 16  16  10  10  6  6 
Number of 
Observations 
 126 142  126 142  58 68  58 68 68 74 68 74 
Notes:  Values are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is calculated by delta method.   Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  
** and * means statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively.  
 TABLE 9 
Determinants of ratio of committee members  
Variables (1)TOBIT 
2006-07 
(2) TOBIT 
2006 
(3) TOBIT 
2007 
(4) TOBIT 
2006-07 
(5) TOBIT 
2006 
(6) TOBIT 
2007 
NATIO 
 
0.09** 
(4.27) 
0.08** 
(2.98) 
0.10** 
(3.23) 
   
NPAS 
 
1.51*104** 
(4.09) 
0.95*104** 
(3.46) 
2.00*104** 
(3.41) 
   
PGDP 
 
5.72** 
(3.63) 
6.21** 
(3.20) 
4.68* 
(2.09) 
2.96* 
(2.11) 
3.37* 
(2.27) 
1.99 
(0.95) 
TOKYO 
 
   0.14** 
(2.49) 
0.12* 
(2.26) 
0.15 
(1.60) 
KYOTO 
 
   0.22** 
(3.82) 
0.14** 
(2.55) 
0.28** 
(3.00) 
HITOT 
 
   0.20** 
(3.47) 
0.15** 
(2.80) 
0.24** 
(2.51) 
WASE 
 
   0.10* 
(1.67) 
0.04 
(0.77) 
0.14 
(1.46) 
KEIO 
 
   0.11* 
(1.98) 
0.08 
(1.53) 
0.13 
(1.40) 
CHUO 
 
   0.08 
(1.35) 
0.04 
(0.79) 
0.10 
(1.05) 
Censored 
Observations 
102 52 50 102 52 50 
Number of 
Observations 
 142 68  74  142 68  74 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means statistically significant 
at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
